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KATRIJN GIELENS, LINDA M. VAN DE GUCHT, JAN-BENEDICT E.M.
STEENKAMP, and MARNIK G. DEKIMPE*
The authors examine the value-destroying and value-enhancing
effects of a giant player’s foreign entry on incumbents operating in that
region. They use Wal-Mart’s entry into the United Kingdom, through its
acquisition of Asda, as the empirical context. Drawing on the marketing,
strategy, and finance literature streams, the authors develop hypotheses
as to why some incumbents are negatively affected whereas others
actually may benefit from the entry of a giant competitor. Their measure
of performance impact is the change in shareholder value around 
the announcement date, which has recently been recognized as an
important metric to evaluate the effectiveness of marketing actions. The
authors find strong support for the conceptual model, which distinguishes
between the seriousness of the threat to the incumbents and their
capacity to withstand the threat. The authors validate their findings using
three alternative measures of company performance: percentage growth
in the incumbent retailer’s sales, earnings before interest and taxes, and
return on assets between 1998 (the year before the Asda takeover) and
2002 (three years after the takeover). The authors discuss various
managerial implications of their results. By acting proactively, incumbents
can mitigate the negative performance consequences, while maximally
benefiting from the positive implications of a giant competitor’s entry.
Keywords: retail power, international retailing, event study, Wal-Mart
Dancing with a Giant: The Effect of
Wal-Mart’s Entry into the United Kingdom
on the Performance of European Retailers
In many industries, ranging from telecommunications, to
banking, to automotive, to retailing, firms are increasingly
entering foreign markets to maintain their growth and prof-
itability. Reflecting the importance of foreign market entry,
academic research has made important progress in under-
standing the antecedents of foreign entry decisions and 
the subsequent performance implications for the foreign
entrants themselves (Mitra and Golder 2002).
Much less is known about the performance implications
for local incumbents. Research taking the incumbent per-
spective has mostly been conducted at an aggregate country
or industry level, ignoring firm-specific differences (e.g.,
Liu et al. 2000). In contrast, microlevel studies have dealt
primarily with one specific outcome, such as overall pro-
ductivity or research-and-development spillovers (Görg and
Greenaway 2004). Previous studies have not considered
multiple value-destroying or -enhancing powers that might
be at work, and questions as to why some firms are hurt (or
gain) more than others have been only partially addressed.
In addition, most foreign market entry studies have exam-
ined firms of comparable size. Rarely have researchers
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1Mizik and Jacobson (2007) show how myopic firms might still be able
to inflate their stock market valuation temporarily. However, such prac-
tices are not easy and come at a high cost.
studied the effect of such an entry by a giant company that
can significantly reshape industry relationships (Aitken and
Harrison 1999). Scant attention has also been given to the
effect of entry in one national market on the performance of
firms in other countries in that region. Given the growing
interconnectedness of countries, such cross-effects are
becoming increasingly important (Gielens and Dekimpe
2007).
The purpose of this article is to address these gaps in the
foreign market entry literature by studying the performance
implications for local (British) incumbents of the entry by a
giant company (i.e., Wal-Mart) in the United Kingdom, as
well as the performance implications on retailers in other
European countries. We do so through an event study. Our
performance metric is shareholder value, the importance of
which is increasingly recognized by marketing scientists
(Srinivasan and Hanssens 2007; Srivastava, Shervani, and
Fahey 1998).
With more than $350 billion in annual sales, Wal-Mart is
the giant among the world’s retailers. The event we study is
Wal-Mart’s 1999 entry into the United Kingdom through its
takeover of Britain’s third-largest retailer, Asda. We study
the stock market reaction for approximately 100 key listed
U.K.-based and continental European retailers, and we test
hypotheses as to why some retailers were affected more
than others. As such, we extend prior research by Singh,
Hansen, and Blattberg (2006) and Stone (1995), who study
the impact of Wal-Mart’s entry on U.S. incumbents in terms
of conventional metrics, such as sales, number of stores vis-
its, and/or average basket size.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Shareholder Value as Performance Metric
Finance scholars have long argued that the market value
of a firm is determined by the expected future cash flows
and the discount rate applied to these cash flows. This view
has gained widespread acceptance in the business literature
(McWilliams and Siegel 1997). Indeed, shareholder value is
an important metric for studying company performance in a
competitive marketplace (Srivastava, Shervani, and Fahey
1998). Strategic moves by a company may affect its own
and its competitors’ shareholder value through changes in
cash flows and discount rates. It is a performance metric
that guides the decisions of top management (Lehmann
2004). The advantages of using shareholder value as a per-
formance metric are that it is forward looking, integrates
multiple dimensions of performance, and is less easily
manipulated by managers than other measures (Geyskens,
Gielens, and Dekimpe 2002; Srinivasan and Bharadwaj
2004).1
Effect of Wal-Mart’s Entry on the Performance of
European Retailers
Wal-Mart’s entry into the United Kingdom could have
both negative and positive effects on the performance
(shareholder value) of European retailers. On the negative
side, Wal-Mart is likely to exert a downward pressure on
the prices other retailers can charge. Hausman and Leibtag
(2005) observe lower average prices in U.S. markets with
Wal-Mart stores. Not only does Wal-Mart charge lower
retail prices, but other players also tend to lower their prices
to remain competitive (Basker 2005). The number of visits
to incumbent stores and the average basket size per visit
might also be reduced (Singh, Hansen, and Blattberg 2006).
Wal-Mart’s entry could also affect wholesale prices.
Because it is such an important customer, Wal-Mart can
obtain the best wholesale prices. Suppliers might subse-
quently seek compensation by charging higher prices to
Wal-Mart’s competitors (Dukes, Gal-Or, and Srinivasan
2006). Moreover, the discount rate applied to cash flows
might increase because the competitive landscape has
become riskier as a result of the entry of a giant new player.
In contrast, Wal-Mart’s entry could have positive effects
on the performance of incumbents. A shift in the power dis-
tribution between Asda and its suppliers could have a cas-
cading effect on suppliers’ negotiating position with other
supermarkets (Bloom and Perry 2001). Lower wholesale
prices for incumbents could also result because of deliber-
ate attempts by suppliers to curtail Wal-Mart’s power (Chen
2003). Moreover, the arrival of Wal-Mart might be viewed
as a prelude to Europe-wide retail productivity increases
and cost decreases, similar to those in the United States
(Johnson 2002; Shahrur 2005). Suppliers collaborating with
Wal-Mart are often forced to implement various efficiency-
improving strategies to continue their relationship, which in
turn may benefit their other corporate customers. Rival
retailers could also enjoy “spillovers” from Wal-Mart by
imitating its methods or by recruiting employees trained by
Wal-Mart and steeped in its know-how. After all, more than
half of Wal-Mart’s productivity edge over its U.S. competi-
tors stems from managerial innovations and training (John-
son 2002). Finally, incumbents’ stock price might also
increase if the Asda takeover increases the probability that
they will be acquired as well, either by Wal-Mart or by
another retailer (Shahrur 2005).
In summary, Wal-Mart’s acquisition of Asda could have
both positive and negative performance implications for its
rivals. For some retailers, the negatives will predominate,
and for others, the positives will weigh more heavily. Draw-
ing on the strategy literature (Chen 1996), we expect that
the net performance effect depends on (1) the seriousness
of the threat posed by Wal-Mart’s entry into the United
Kingdom to the incumbent retailer in question and (2) the
retailer’s capacity to withstand the threat. If the seriousness
of the threat posed by Wal-Mart’s entry is low and the
retailer’s capacity to withstand the threat is high, positive
consequences will tend to outweigh the negative impacts.
However, we expect the converse to hold when the threat is
high and the capacity to withstand it is low, with various
scenarios in between these extremes.
These two drivers are multifaceted constructs in that spe-
cific components can be distinguished in the seriousness of
the threat posed by Wal-Mart’s entry and the incumbent’s
ability to withstand that threat. This provides a rationale for
why a wide range of stock price reactions is likely. Figure 1
shows our conceptual framework, delineating these factors
and the direction of their expected moderating effects.
Seriousness of the Threat
The more serious the threat the entry poses to a particular
incumbent retailer, the more negative are its performance




Effect on Shareholder Value
Incumbent Retailer
Seriousness of the Threat
•Overlap in assortment (–)
•Overlap in positioning (–)
•Overlap in country of entry (–)
•Overlap in assortment × overlap in country of entry (–)
•Overlap in positioning × overlap in country of entry (–)







•Presence in countries with price focus (+)
•Presence in competitive countries (+)
•International diversity (+)
-Wal-Mart-Specific Competitive Repertoires
•Number of overlapping countries (+)
•Importance of overlapping countries to incumbent (+)
•Symmetry in importance of overlapping countries (+)
H1–H2
H3–H5
Notes: Hypotheses supported in our empirical analyses are in bold.
implications. According to competition theory, new entrants
pose the greatest threat to competitors with which they
exhibit high market overlap (Chen 1996). Chen and Miller
(1994, p. 89) refer to this phenomenon as “the centrality of
the attack.” Market overlap can occur on different dimen-
sions, including product assortment, positioning, and
geography.
Overlap in assortment. Retailers carrying assortments
that overlap substantially with Wal-Mart’s will be more vul-
nerable than retailers with assortments that do not overlap
much. Wal-Mart’s logistical efficiency and global purchas-
ing power enable it to offer its assortment at considerably
lower prices than most of its competitors. To stay competi-
tive, these competitors are forced to reduce their prices,
thus reducing their margins and cash flows. The more
closely Wal-Mart competes with existing outlets, the greater
is the downward pressure on the latter’s prices (Hausman
and Leibtag 2005).
Overlap in positioning. A central concept in Wal-Mart’s
strategy is its everyday low pricing (EDLP), backed by an
aggressive marketing strategy, with slogans such as “Dare
to Compare” and “Low Prices Always.” Retailers with a
similar EDLP positioning are expected to suffer more from
Wal-Mart’s entry. A direct price comparison is easier to
make with another EDLP store than with a hi–lo store and
is likely to be unfavorable for EDLP retailers. Moreover,
incumbents with a similar pricing positioning respond more
aggressively to Wal-Mart entries than other retailers
(Khanna and Tice 2000). Price reductions in an (often
unsuccessful) attempt to match Wal-Mart’s prices tend to
reduce other retailers’ expected performance.
Overlap in country of entry. Wal-Mart entered a specific
geographical entity (i.e., the United Kingdom). Despite cur-
rent trends toward globalization, retailing still has an
important local component. Thus, retailers that are highly
dependent on the United Kingdom as a source of revenues
are more directly threatened by Wal-Mart’s entry than
retailers that are less dependent.
The importance of local competition in the retailing
industry also suggests that overlap both in assortment and
in positioning between Wal-Mart and an incumbent retailer
is especially threatening if the incumbent is active in and
dependent on the United Kingdom. Thus, we hypothesize
that overlap in assortment and in positioning interacts with
overlap in country of entry.
H1: The more serious the threat posed by Wal-Mart’s entry into
the United Kingdom, the more negative are the perform-
ance implications for the incumbent retailer. Specifically,
the performance of the incumbent is negatively affected by
the degree of overlap with Wal-Mart on (a) assortment, (b)
positioning, and (c) country of entry.
H2: The more dependent an incumbent retailer is on the United
Kingdom as a source of revenues, the stronger are the nega-
tive performance implications of (a) overlap in assortment
and (b) overlap in positioning with Wal-Mart.
Capacity to Withstand the Threat
Retailers differ not only in the extent to which Wal-
Mart’s entry poses a serious threat to them but also in their
capacity to withstand the threat. The lower an incumbent’s
capacity to withstand the new threat, the more its perform-
ance are adversely affected. An organization’s ability to
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withstand a threat depends on both its financial resources
and its organizational capabilities (Day 1997). Neither
gives the full picture, but together they describe how retail-
ers differ in their capacity to withstand the threat posed by
Wal-Mart’s entry.
Financial Resources
We consider three components of financial capacity or
resilience commonly employed in the finance literature: (1)
size, (2) cash flow generation, and (3) the extent of finan-
cial leverage. First, larger retailers have more resources and
are better able to withstand Wal-Mart’s entry because they
have already demonstrated their competitiveness through
prior growth (see Barkema and Vermeulen 1998). Second,
incumbents with a healthy cash flow margin are better
poised to withstand the increased competition than less
profitable retailers. They have more room to respond to
Wal-Mart’s EDLP strategy, to invest in strategic changes,
and to buffer themselves from external threats (Miller and
Chen 1996a). They have the financial resources to try out
new strategic responses, which might be necessary if their
previous competitive repertoire is ineffective when a major
competitor enters the market. Third, highly leveraged firms
are more likely to lack the financial flexibility to make
strategic investments in response to Wal-Mart’s entry than
more conservatively financed retailers (Chevalier 1995).
Liquidity-constrained firms also charge higher prices than
less constrained firms (Chevalier and Scharfstein 1996),
making it more difficult for the former to remain competi-
tive when a dominant, low-cost retailer enters the market
(Hausman and Leibtag 2005). Thus:
H3: The greater the incumbent’s financial capacity to withstand
the threat posed by Wal-Mart’s entry into the United King-
dom, the more positive are the performance implications.
Specifically, the performance of the incumbent is positively
affected by its (1) size, (2) profitability, and (3) financial
leverage.
Organizational Capabilities
Because of their specific past experiences, some retailers
may have learned distinct organizational capabilities that
render them more likely to survive and prosper in the new
competitive environment than other retailers. Accumulated
experiences can span a wide variety of learning, but not all
of these will be equally helpful. Two key insights from the
organizational learning literature are as follows: (1) The
most significant forms of learning are about ways of doing
business, and (2) learning occurs best through direct experi-
ence (Easterby-Smith 1997). In relation to the Wal-Mart
case, there are two possibilities in terms of organizational
learning. First, the company may have developed specific
core competencies that are especially relevant in the battle
with Wal-Mart. Second, the retailer may have acquired Wal-
Mart-specific competitive repertoires as a result of prior
contact with Wal-Mart in other countries.
Core competencies. Core competencies are “the collec-
tive learning in the organization” (Prahalad and Hamel
1990, p. 82). Successful firms have developed core compe-
tencies on which they can draw when encountering new and
unanticipated circumstances. In the battle with Wal-Mart, at
least three core competencies appear to be especially perti-
nent: (1) countries with a strong price focus, (2) competi-
tiveness of countries, and (3) international diversity. First,
incumbent retailers accustomed to operating in countries
dominated by price fighters have learned either to match
competing price offers or to differentiate themselves (Liang
2003). Moreover, to these incumbents, the new entrant (i.e.,
Wal-Mart) does not offer a totally new service or product 
to the market. Second, countries differ dramatically in the
competitiveness of their business environment (Porter
1990). Retailers that are active in competitive countries
have sharpened their core competencies because they are
continuously challenged by strong rivals, aggressive suppli-
ers, and demanding customers. Retailers in protected coun-
tries have had less opportunity to develop and refine their
competitive skills. Third, retailers that operate in multiple
national settings have been exposed to diverse ways of
competing and to different institutional contexts. They are
forced to develop strategic flexibility and an array of mar-
keting competencies to create competitive advantages over
various rivals in different countries. These qualities benefit
the retailer when it is faced with a rival such as Wal-Mart,
which has the potential to upset established patterns of
rivalry (Baum and Korn 1999). Miller and Chen (1996b)
find that organizational learning about a wide array of
competitive actions positively affects subsequent firm per-
formance, especially in times of high market uncertainty.
From a financial perspective, international diversity acts as
a “portfolio,” stabilizing firm earnings and increasing the
chances of survival (Zahra, Ireland, and Hitt 2000).
H4: Incumbents that have acquired certain core competencies
are better able to withstand the threat posed by Wal-Mart’s
entry into the United Kingdom than retailers that have not
acquired these competencies. Specifically, the performance
of the incumbent is positively affected by (a) the extent to
which the incumbent has built up experience in countries
with a price focus, (b) the degree to which it has been
exposed to the rigor of competitive countries, and (c) its
international diversity.
Wal-Mart-specific competitive repertoires. The larger the
stock of accumulated experiences of previous encounters
with Wal-Mart, the greater is the retailer’s organizational
capacity to withstand the threat posed by Wal-Mart’s entry
into the United Kingdom. In this context, the concept of
competitive repertoire is useful. It refers to a firm’s ability
to initiate a set of concrete marketing actions to attract,
serve, and keep customers in the face of competitive
threats. Competitive repertoires are shaped in the context of
direct and extensive contact with rivals (Miller and Chen
1996b, p. 420). Direct contact with Wal-Mart is reflected
by overlap in countries, and extensiveness of contact is
reflected in the importance of these countries to the incum-
bent and the symmetry of the stakes that both retailers hold
in those countries.
If a retailer has already encountered Wal-Mart in other
countries, it may have learned how best to cope with this
competitor (Gimeno and Woo 1999) and may have obtained
insight into which strategies work and which do not. Such
retailers should be more likely to avoid costly mistakes than
those that have never encountered Wal-Mart before (Baum
and Korn 1999).
Simply “meeting” Wal-Mart in different countries is not
the entire story. If the contact is only in peripheral, unim-
portant countries, a retailer’s learning would be much less
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than if it were to encounter Wal-Mart in its key countries
(Miller and Chen 1996b). Indeed, firms are more aware of
their competitors in countries on which they are highly
dependent (Chen and MacMillan 1992) and thus will moni-
tor them more closely. The development of Wal-Mart-
specific competitive repertoires is greater when previous
experience is built up in countries that are important to the
incumbent than when such experience is built up in coun-
tries that are unimportant.
The extent of learning about a competitor is greatest
when the relative importance of various countries is sym-
metric across the two competitors (Gimeno 1999). If coun-
tries in which the incumbent meets Wal-Mart are unimpor-
tant to the incumbent but are important to Wal-Mart,
incumbent learning will be lower because there is little at
stake and, thus, less motivation to learn (Chen 1996). If the
reverse is true, the development of Wal-Mart-specific reper-
toires will be hurt because Wal-Mart’s best practices may
not be fully exhibited (see Gimeno 1999). Thus:
H5: Incumbents that have acquired Wal-Mart-specific competi-
tive repertoires are better able to withstand the threat posed
by Wal-Mart’s entry into the United Kingdom than retailers
that have not acquired such competitive repertoires.
Specifically, the performance of the incumbent is positively
affected by (a) the number of countries in which it has
already encountered Wal-Mart, (b) the importance of these
overlapping countries to the incumbent, and (c) the symme-
try in importance of overlapping countries for Wal-Mart
versus the incumbent.
METHOD
We use an event study to calculate the cumulative abnor-
mal stock returns for the rival retailers as a result of Wal-
Mart’s announcement that it would acquire Asda. We calcu-
late these abnormal returns over a time window centered on
the announcement day of the takeover. Next, we cross-
sectionally relate these abnormal returns to the aforemen-
tioned characteristics that describe the seriousness of the
threat Wal-Mart poses and the incumbent firm’s capacity to
withstand the threat.
Event Studies
Event studies measure the effect of new information on
the market value of a firm’s stock. The approach rests on
the assumption that financial markets are efficient. Accord-
ing to the semistrong version of the efficient-market
hypothesis, the stock price accurately reflects all publicly
available information about the firm. Under this assump-
tion, the market price of the firm’s stock immediately and
unbiasedly changes to reflect new information that arrives
in the market (for a detailed exposition, see Brown and
Warner 1985).
When an event occurs (i.e., when new information is
made public), investors update their expectations about the
firm’s future performance and react by buying or selling
shares of firms they believe will be affected. The continu-
ously compounded daily return in the stock price between
day t – 1 and day t is given by

















where Pi,t is the closing stock price of retailer i at the end of
trading day t and Rit reflects the market’s expectations of
the long-term financial impact of all relevant information
that became available between t – 1 and t. The observed
stock return Rit on the event day (i.e., the day Wal-Mart’s
bid for Asda was announced) is compared with E(Rit), the
return expected if the event had not taken place. In line with
Brown and Warner’s (1985) approach, we use the market
model to obtain estimates of a retailer’s expected returns.
According to this model, we express the expected return
E(Rit) as a linear function of the returns on a benchmark
portfolio of marketable assets Rmt:
where α̂i and bi are the ordinary least squares estimates
obtained from regressing Rit on Rmt over an estimation
period preceding the event. In our setting, the estimation
sample covers 260 to 10 days before Wal-Mart’s takeover
bid. The difference between the observed actual return and
the estimated expected return, eit, is a measure of abnormal
return (AR) for retailer i at day t:
The term eit provides an unbiased estimate of the future
earnings generated by the event and is a random variable
with a zero mean (Fama 1970). Firms that are expected to
suffer greatly from Wal-Mart’s entry will experience large
negative abnormal returns, but eit will be small (or positive)
for retailers that are affected only a little by (or may even
benefit from) the event.
To allow for information leakage before the event day
and for the possibility that not all information is dissemi-
nated completely on the event day (McWilliams and Siegel
1997), we aggregate the abnormal returns for a firm over
the “event period” [–t1, t2] into a cumulative abnormal
return (CAR) to draw overall inferences on the expected
performance impact of the event of interest:
where t = 0 on the event day. Because we conducted the
event study across K different retailers, this CAR can be
averaged into a cumulative average abnormal return
(CAAR):
We assess the significance of the CAAR through Patell’s
(1976) statistic, in which the abnormal returns are standard-
ized by the standard deviation of the estimation period
abnormal returns. This statistic reduces the effect of stocks
with large return standard deviations. The extent of infor-
mation leakage and dissemination is an empirical issue and
is determined on the basis of the significance of the respec-
tive daily average abnormal return (AAR) terms on the days
surrounding the event day. Expanding the event window
with insignificant AARs reduces the precision of the esti-
mated effects because more unrelated noise is averaged into
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the effect (Whinston and Collins 1992; for a review of
event-study applications in marketing, see Srinivasan and
Bharadwaj 2004).
Test of Moderator Effects
We test our hypotheses on the differential impact of Wal-
Mart’s entry on incumbent retailers through a cross-
sectional regression on the abnormal returns:
(6) CARi[–t1, t2] = b0 + b1OAi + b2OPi + b3OCEi
+ b4OAi × OCEi + b5OPi × OCEi 
+ b6Sizei + b7Profiti + b8FinLevi 
+ b9PriceFocusi + b10Compi + b11IntDivi 
+ b12GOi + b13IMPi + b14Symmi + εi,
where OA, OP, and OCE denote the seriousness-of-threat
constructs of overlap in assortment, positioning, and coun-
try of entry (the United Kingdom), respectively. Size,
Profit, and FinLev indicate the financial resources con-
structs of retailer size, profitability, and financial leverage.
PriceFocus, Comp, and IntDiv indicate the core competen-
cies constructs of presence in countries with a strong price
focus, presence in competitive countries, and international
diversity. Finally, GO, IMP, and Symm are the Wal-Mart-
specific competitive repertoire variables of global geo-
graphical overlap between the incumbent and Wal-Mart,
importance of the overlapping countries, and symmetry in
importance. Following the work of Jain (1982), we use
standardized CARi as the dependent variable to reduce het-
eroskedasticity problems that might arise when the esti-
mated variances of the market-model residuals vary across
different retailers. To correct for a potential violation of the
statistical independence assumption that exists because
some retailers have the same country of origin, we use a




In a surprise move, Wal-Mart announced on June 14,
1999, that it placed a bid for Asda Group Plc, Britain’s
third-largest supermarket group, offering to buy the com-
pany for £6.7 billion ($1.8 billion), corresponding to a
value of 220 pence per share (Nelson and Beck 1999). At
the time of the takeover bid, Wal-Mart’s sales were about
six times those of the British supermarket leader and almost
one-tenth of Britain’s economic output. The move substan-
tially expanded Wal-Mart’s sales in Europe, which thus far
included only limited operations in Germany. In 1998, Asda
had realized revenues of $6.8 billion, achieving a 7.5%
share of the U.K. grocery retail market. In general, it was
believed that Asda would benefit from Wal-Mart’s global
purchasing and cost-reduction capabilities.
The news sent shockwaves through the European retail
industry. On June 15, Britain’s The Independent called Wal-
Mart’s arrival “the nightmare coming true” (Cope 1999),
The Times headlined “U.S. Price-Busters Invade Britain”
(Whitworth 1999), and other press reports echoed the fears
of European retailers and suppliers. Analysts described the
move as a “knockout blow” that would change not only
British retailing but also Europe’s retailing in general.
2Our sample composition reflects the dominance of U.K.-listed firms in
the European equity market. For example, in 2004, the London exchange
listed 2837 firms, compared with 1333 firms listed on Euronext (Brussels,
Amsterdam, Paris, and Lisbon) and 819 in Germany (http://www.world-
exchanges.org).
Sample Selection and Composition
We constructed a data set that identifies Wal-Mart’s most
important retail rivals in Europe. Through Thompson Ana-
lytics, we selected all firms that (1) reported retail activities
in at least one European Union country and (2) were listed
on a European stock exchange. Next, we eliminated firms
that did not have retail activities as part of their main activ-
ities (e.g., Christian Dior). The source we used for this
exercise is also Thompson Analytics, which distinguishes a
firm’s activities according to “main” versus “other.” We fur-
ther eliminated retail companies whose assortment had no
overlap with Wal-Mart’s. A typical Wal-Mart store’s assort-
ment comprises grocery, candy and tobacco, soft goods,
shoes, cosmetics, pharmaceuticals, jewelry, electronics,
health and beauty, sports goods and toys, stationery and
books, photo processing, and hard goods (www.planet
retail.net). As such, car dealers, for example, were excluded
from our sample. Following the work of Song and Walkling
(2000), we deleted 26 retail firms with more than 190 days
of missing returns in Datastream in the estimation period
(250 days).
Thus, the sample comprised 98 retail firms, 50 of which
originated in the United Kingdom. The remaining 48 retail-
ers came from various other European countries.2 Of the 98
retailers, 30% are predominantly grocery retailers (e.g.,
Ahold, Carrefour, Delhaize, Jeronimo Martins, Kesko,
Metro Group, Tesco). The other 70% were primarily active
in various nongrocery retail activities, such as candy (e.g.,
Thorntons), clothing (e.g., Etam, Hennes & Mauritz, Indi-
tex, Matalan), shoes (e.g., Brantano, Stylo, Wedins Skor),
cosmetics and pharmaceuticals (e.g., The Body Shop,
Boots, Douglas Holding, Marionnaud Parfumeries), jewelry
(e.g., Signet Group), sports (e.g., Black Leisure Group,
Gresvig, JJB Sports), toys (e.g., Clinton Cards, Game
Group), stationery and books (e.g., Ottakar’s, WHSmith),
electronic appliances (e.g., Dixons, Sodice Expansion), fur-
niture (e.g., Moebel Walther), and do-it-yourself (e.g.,
Bricorama, Kingfisher, Hornbach).
Operationalization of the Measures
Financial performance. We used daily stock prices from
Datastream to calculate the observed returns Rit. For Rmt,
we used the respective stock market indexes for the differ-
ent European countries, as reported in Datastream. A given
market index consists of a stock portfolio of the most
important companies in that country; the individual stocks
are weighted by their firm’s market value.
Seriousness of the threat. Overlap in assortment reflects
the extent to which product markets, in which an incumbent
retailer meets Wal-Mart, are important to that retailer. Over-
lap in positioning captures whether the incumbent retailer
has experience as an EDLP player. Overlap in country of
entry reflects the stake of the incumbent retailer in the
United Kingdom.
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M Mdn SD Range Sources
Seriousness of the Threat
Overlap in assortment
Overlap in positioning











COMPUSTAT, Planet Retail, company reports
Planet Retail, company reports
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Presence in countries with price focus














COMPUSTAT, Planet Retail, company reports
COMPUSTAT, IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook
COMPUSTAT, Planet Retail
Wal-Mart-specific competitive repertoires
Number of overlapping countries














COMPUSTAT, Planet Retail, company reports
COMPUSTAT, Planet Retail, company reports
COMPUSTAT, Planet Retail, company reports
N = 98
Table 1
DESCRIPTIVES OF THE COVARIATES
Financial resources. We measured firm size by the total
global sales of the company and profitability as funds from
operations divided by sales. We measured financial lever-
age as the ratio of debt to total assets.
Core competencies. The price orientation of countries 
is given by the weighted average of the proportion of
discount-format sales in the total retail sales of the coun-
tries in which the incumbent firm operates. Presence in
competitive countries is the weighted average of the IMD
World Competitiveness Scores of all countries in which the
incumbent firm operates. We express international diversity
as a Herfindahl-type quantitative index, based on the pro-
portion of a retailer’s sales reported in the different coun-
tries in which the retailer operates.
Wal-Mart-specific competitive repertoires. Geographical
overlap between the incumbent and Wal-Mart reflects the
total number of countries in which both the incumbent
retailer and Wal-Mart operate. The importance of the over-
lap to the incumbent is based on the shares of a retailer’s
sales realized in countries in which it meets Wal-Mart. The
symmetry in importance of geographical overlap for Wal-
Mart versus the incumbent reflects absolute differences in
an incumbent retailer’s and Wal-Mart’s stakes in a specific
geographic market. In the case of total symmetry, these
measures equal 100. In the absence of any contact, we set
their value to 0. Thus, higher scores correspond to higher
levels of symmetry.
Data for all moderators were from 1998 (i.e., the year
before Wal-Mart’s acquisition of Asda). A detailed descrip-
tion of all measures appear in the Appendix, along with an
illustration involving the Belgian retailer Delhaize, which
also operates in the United States under the Food Lion
banner. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the
variables used in the empirical study, and Table 2 reports
the correlations between the covariates. According to Judge
and colleagues (1988), bivariate correlations exceeding .8
and variance inflation factors exceeding 5 are indications 
of potential multicollinearity problems. In our case, the
absolute value of all correlations is below .70, and the
largest variance inflation factor is 3.42.
RESULTS
Effect of Wal-Mart’s Entry on the Performance of
European Retailers
Table 3 presents information on daily AARs for the 98
retail incumbents for a window of ten trading days around
the event day. On the announcement day, the incumbent
retailers experienced an average negative impact of –.42%,
which is close to significance (p = .12). On day t + 1, they
experienced an average significant negative abnormal return
of –.34% (p < .05). We found no evidence of information
leakage before the announcement, which is consistent with
the numerous press reports that the move took all market
participants by surprise.
The total average effect over Days 0 and 1 (i.e.,
CAAR[0, 1]) is significant (p < .05) and amounts to –.76%.
We find no significant effects after Day +1. Moreover, nei-
ther CAAR[2, 5] nor CAAR[2, 10] nor CAAR[2, 15] is
significant. As such, our results suggest a rapid adjustment
in shareholder value following the announcement. We also
computed the additional CARs from Day +2 onward, for 
up to 100 trading days after the event (i.e., CARi[2, 2],
CARi[2, 3], …, CARi[2, 100]). A pooled regression against
the number of trading days since the takeover announce-
ment shows no significant drift (p > .10), indicating that the
initial negative evaluation was not just a short-term drop
that was corrected in the subsequent weeks (for a similar
test procedure, see Geykens, Gielens, and Dekimpe 2002).
The short event window and the insignificance of the subse-
quent drift are in line with the presumed efficiency of the
stock markets (Kothari and Warner 2007).
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Table 3
RESULTS: MEAN DAILY ABNORMAL RETURN
Mean Abnormal 
Day Return % Positive Patell t-Statistic p-Value
–5 –.0004 39.8 –.04 .48
–4 –.0027 55.1 1.11 .86
–3 –.0013 42.9 –.34 .37
–2 .0032 60.2 1.22 .89
–1 –.0034 32.7 –.71 .24
0 –.0042 58.2 –1.17 .12
1 –.0034 41.8 –1.70 .04
2 –.0023 42.8 –1.03 .15
3 –.0016 46.9 –.59 .28
4 –.0003 48.9 –.45 .33
5 .0006 41.8 .17 .56
Notes: N = 98. ARi,t measures the abnormal return on a specific day t
for firm i. We report the mean ARt, which is averaged across all firms on
day t. We report the results for the ten days surrounding the announcement
date on day 0.
3We follow Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz’s (2004) approach in esti-
mating the dollar returns. Specifically, we subtract from the gross change
in the value of the rival’s equity (stock price times the number of shares
outstanding) the predicted change from the market model.
In dollar terms, across all incumbent retailers in our sam-
ple, the net performance effect is –$5.68 billion.3 As a point
of comparison, the change in market value for the Asda
shareholders between the end of the last trading day before
the offer and the end of Day +1 was $1.47 billion. When we
combine all positive and negative performance effects
across all retailers in our study (including the wealth crea-
tion for Asda shareholders), Wal-Mart’s entry into the
United Kingdom wiped out $4.21 billion in value for the
European retail firms. As for Wal-Mart itself, there is a
negative CAR[0, 1] of –.83%, corresponding to a value loss
of $1.66 billion. This result is consistent with that of
Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004), who find that
shareholders of small bidders gain on average but that the
abnormal returns for shareholders of large bidders are
negative.
Factors Explaining Performance Differences Between
Incumbent Retailers
More notable than the overall negative value for
CAAR[0, 1] is the variation in CARi[0, 1] across individual
retailers. Table 3 already indicates that there is considerable
variation in the abnormal returns across retailers. The col-
lective wisdom of the financial markets did not evaluate 
the entry of Wal-Mart into the U.K. market as a unitary
phenomenon, affecting all incumbent retailers equally. To
understand these substantial differences in performance for
individual retailers, we estimated Equation 6 with the indi-
vidual firms’ CAR[0, 1] as dependent variable. Table 4
presents the results.
Seriousness of the threat. H1 and H2 pertain to the seri-
ousness of the threat to the incumbent posed by Wal-Mart’s
entry into the United Kingdom as a driver of the expected
future performance of that retailer. We find strong support
for its anticipated negative effect on incumbent perform-
Dependent Variable: CAR[0, 1] Hypothesis Expected Sign b |t|
Intercept
Seriousness of the Threat
Overlap in assortment (b1)
Overlap in positioning (b2)
Overlap in country of entry (b3)
Overlap assortment × overlap country of entry (b4)
Overlap positioning × overlap country of entry (b5)






Development of core competencies
Presence in countries with price focus (b9)
Presence in competitive countries (b10)
International diversity (b11)
Wal-Mart-specific competitive repertoires
Number of overlapping countries (b12)
Importance of overlapping countries to incumbent (b13)
Symmetry importance of overlapping countries (b14)





























































*p < .001 (one-sided).
**p < .01 (one-sided).
***p < .05 (one-sided).
†p < .10 (one-sided).
Notes: Hypotheses that are supported are in bold.
Table 4
RESULTS: MODERATOR ANALYSIS
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ance. The greater the degree of overlap in assortment (b1 =
–.006, p < .001), positioning (b2 = –.070, p < .001), and
country of entry (b3 = –.081, p < .001) between the incum-
bent and Wal-Mart, the lower was the performance of the
incumbent. These findings support H1a–c.
Not only were retailers that were more dependent in the
United Kingdom affected more adversely than other retail-
ers (H1c), but their dependence also exacerbated the nega-
tive performance implications of overlap in positioning
(b5 = –.065, p < .001), in support of H2b. The interaction
with overlap in assortment is in the expected direction (H2a)
but does not reach statistical significance.
Capacity to withstand the threat. The incumbent
retailer’s financial (H3) and organizational (H4–H5) capaci-
ties to withstand the threat posed by Wal-Mart matter as
well. The performance of incumbent retailers that are larger
(H3a: b6 = .007, p < .10), more profitable (H3b: b7 = .002,
p < .01), and less financially leveraged (H3c: b8 = –.026, p <
.01) was less negatively (more positively) affected than the
performance of smaller, less profitable, and more leveraged
retailers. The former types of retailers are best positioned to
respond to the threat that the entry of Wal-Mart brings to
the European scene. Collectively, these findings provide
support for the role of the incumbent’s financial resilience
in offsetting possible negative performance implications
due to the seriousness of the threat posed by Wal-Mart.
Financial markets also recognize the importance of non-
financial, organizational factors in firm success. H4 outlines
the role of relevant core competencies in withstanding the
threat posed by Wal-Mart’s entry into the United Kingdom.
In support of this hypothesis, we find that incumbents that
honed their skills in countries with a strong focus on price
(H4a: b9 = .148, p < .05), in competitive countries (H4b:
b10 = .001, p < .05), and in a variety of international mar-
kets (H4c: b11 = .029, p < .05) performed better than retail-
ers that had been less active in these markets.
H5 highlights the importance for a company’s perform-
ance in having developed Wal-Mart-specific competitive
repertoires. Incumbent retailers that had extensive prior
geographical overlap with Wal-Mart (b12 = .011, p < .01)
and that already met Wal-Mart in key countries (b13 = .024,
p < .10) performed better than retailers that had not encoun-
tered Wal-Mart in other countries or only in countries that
were relatively unimportant to the incumbent. Finally, the
more symmetric the incumbent’s and Wal-Mart’s stake in
different countries, the higher was the expected perform-
ance (b14 = .014, p < .05). These findings support H5a–c.
VALIDATION ANALYSES
Alternative Ways to Compute Abnormal Returns
Our dependent measure is the CAR over Days 0 and 1
(CARi[0, 1]), where “abnormal” is operationalized as the
difference between the observed actual return and the esti-
mated expected return based on the market-return model.
Alternatives to our measure can be envisaged with respect
to the time window considered and the benchmark used to
compute the expected returns. We performed validation
checks along both dimensions.
Different time windows. Because it is common to include
the day of the announcement in the event window
(MacKinlay 1997) and given that it is advisable to work
4A third alternative is Fama and French’s (1993) three-factor model. We
did not consider this model in our validation analyses, because the
required daily data for the Fama–French factors were not available for the
ten international markets. Moreover, when working with event windows of
some days around the announcement day (as we do here), the difference
between the market-return model and the Fama–French model is typically
inconsequential (Kothari and Warner 2007).
with a small event window (McWilliams and Siegel 1997;
Srinivasan and Bharadwaj 2004), we opted to work with the
firms’ CARi[0, 1] as the dependent variable in our base
model. However, although AAR[1] was significant when
we used commonly accepted cutoffs, this was not the case
for AAR[0], for which we obtained a p-value of .12 (Table
3). Given the modest p-value for AAR[0], the question
emerges whether our results are robust to limiting our
analyses to the abnormal returns for Day 1 only.
To address this issue, we replicated the analyses using
ARi[1]. As such, CARi[0, 1] and ARi[1] were correlated
(.89, p < .01), and the moderator analysis using ARi[1] as
the dependent variable yielded the same substantive results.
All moderators had the expected sign, and all significant
effects reported in Table 4 were replicated using ARi[1] as
the dependent variable.
Alternatively, it could be argued that if we include
ARi[0], we should also include ARi[2] because AAR[2] and
AAR[0] have roughly comparable p-values (Table 3). The
correlation between CARi[0, 1] and CARi[0, 2] was .68
(p < .01), and the moderator analysis was robust to using
CARi[0, 2] as the dependent variable. All coefficients had
the expected sign, and we replicated 11 of the 13 significant
effects reported in Table 4.
Different model for expected return. Two common
choices for modeling the expected return for a share in a
small window are the market-return model, which we use,
and the constant-mean-return model, which assumes that
the return of a security is constant over time (MacKinlay
1997).4 We replicated our analyses using the constant-
mean-return model. Our main findings were robust across
the two models. Again, CAAR[0, 1] was significant (p <
.05) and of comparable magnitude (–.86%) to the market-
return model (–.76%). The two operationalizations of
CARi[0, 1] were correlated (.81, p < .01). The moderator
analysis was also robust across the two models. All coeffi-
cients had the expected sign, and we replicated 12 of the 13
significant effects reported in Table 4 using the constant-
mean-return model.
Other Measures of Company Performance
Although event studies are well established in finance,
the assumption of efficient markets, which underlies this
method, has been contested (for reviews of this debate, see
Ball 1995; Fama 1998). A vast body of literature in market-
ing and elsewhere has documented bounded rationality and
judgment biases. Event study proponents argue that such
biases may well occur at the individual level but that mar-
kets exhibit information aggregation behavior through
which they act as if they were fully informed and rational
(Ball 1995; Surowiecki 2004). Still, the possibility cannot
be ignored that initial reactions to a major event might be
biased.
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Intercept
Seriousness of the Threat
Overlap in assortment (b1)
Overlap in positioning (b2)
Overlap in country of entry (b3)
Overlap assortment × overlap country of entry (b4)
Overlap positioning × overlap country of entry (b5)






Development of core competencies
Presence in countries with price focus (b9)
Presence in competitive countries (b10)
International diversity (b11)
Wal-Mart-specific competitive repertoires
Number of overlapping countries (b12)
Importance of overlapping countries to incumbent (b13)









































































































N = 98 R2 = .31 R2 = .30 R2 = .29
*p < .001 (one-sided).
**p < .01 (one-sided).
***p < .05 (one-sided).
†p < .10 (one-sided).
††p < .05 (two-sided).
Table 5
MODERATOR ANALYSIS FOR ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF COMPANY PERFORMANCE
To address these concerns, we considered three alterna-
tive performance metrics: the percentage growth in (1)
sales, (2) earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT), and (3)
return on assets (ROA) between 1998 (the year before the
Asda takeover) and 2002 (three years after the takeover).
Although there might have been many confounding events
in the three years following the takeover, it might be
expected that these variables at least moved in the same
direction as the initial stock market reaction. We collected
data on these alternative performance measures from
Datamonitor.
We find evidence that, indeed, the three alternative per-
formance measures (i.e., percentage change in Salesi,
EBITi, and ROAi on the one hand and CARi[0, 1] on the
other hand) moved in the same direction; the correlations
were .170 (p = .08), .237 (p = .05), and .161 (p = .11),
respectively. Of these three measures, sales growth is most
closely aligned with the marketing discipline. Note that
sales growth exhibits a higher correlation with CARi[0, 1]
than with percentage change in EBITi (.081, p = .41) or
with percentage change in ROAi (.085, p = .45).
We replicated the moderator analysis using each of these
alternative performance measures as the dependent
variable. As Table 5 details, significant effects in these new
analyses were always of the same sign as in our base
model. Notably, however, each alternative measure was
affected by a distinct subset of drivers. Sales growth was
primarily affected by the seriousness of the threat, change
in EBIT by the incumbents’ core competencies, and change
in ROA by Wal-Mart-specific competitive repertoires and
financial capacity. The combined evidence from these three
models supports both our conceptual model (all compo-
nents mattered for at least one of these alternative perform-
ance metrics) and our empirical results (significant effects
had the “right” sign). It also illustrates our contention that
the stock market considers multiple dimensions in arriving
at its consensus reaction to the event.
DISCUSSION
In this article, we examined the effect of Wal-Mart’s
entry into the United Kingdom on the performance of Euro-
pean retailers. Drawing on the marketing, strategy, and
finance literature streams, we developed hypotheses as to
why some retailers are expected to be affected differently
than others. Our focal measure of performance is share-
holder value, which has recently been recognized as an
important metric for evaluating the effect of marketing
actions (Lehmann 2004), but we validated our findings
using alternative performance metrics and tested our
hypotheses on nearly 100 European retailers.
Our findings provide broad support for our conceptual
model and the relevance of distinguishing between the seri-
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DIFFERENT LEVELS OF SERIOUSNESS OF THE THREAT AND
CAPACITY TO WITHSTAND THE THREAT
























Seriousness of the Threat
Low High
5The median split was an approximation because the classification was
based on a combination of multiple variables.
ousness of a threat to an incumbent and the incumbent’s
capacity to withstand the threat. We find that the expected
performance of incumbents is negatively affected by the
degree of overlap with Wal-Mart in assortment, positioning,
and country of entry. Overlap in country of entry amplifies
the negative implications of overlap in positioning.
We find that the incumbent’s capacity to withstand the
threat matters as well. Small, less profitable, and financially
highly leveraged firms are much more negatively affected
than firms with stronger financial resources. In addition to
the financial capacity, the organizational capacity to with-
stand the threat plays an important role. Retailers that have
built organizational experience in countries with a strong
price focus, in competitive countries, and in international
markets are less negatively affected than retailers that have
not built up these experiences. Finally, development of a
competitive repertoire based on direct competition with the
entrant (Wal-Mart) in other countries also plays a signifi-
cant, positive role.
In Table 4, we detail the effect of specific factors belong-
ing to the two metaconstructs that constitute our conceptual
framework, namely, seriousness of the threat and capacity
to withstand the threat. We further highlight our findings by
considering the 2 × 2 matrix in Figure 2, in which we dis-
tinguish between incumbents that rate low and those that
rate high on our two metaconstructs, based on an approxi-
mate median split.5 We focus on these two metaconstructs
rather than on specific moderators because they subsume
multiple factors. This enables us to incorporate all relevant
covariates to illustrate our findings. For each cell, we pro-
vide mean CAR[0, 1].
Consistent with our theorizing, incumbent retailers in
Cell 2—high on seriousness of the threat and low on capac-
ity to withstand the threat—are worse off, with a CAAR of
–4.9%. If seriously threatened retailers have a high rather
than low capacity to withstand the threat (Cell 4 versus Cell
2), the CAAR increases from –4.9% to –1.3%. Retailers
that are not seriously threatened by Wal-Mart but have a
low capacity to withstand its threat (Cell 1) are expected to
benefit mildly from the positive changes Wal-Mart brings to
European marketing systems, as reflected in a CAAR of
1.3%. If the retailer also has a strong capacity to withstand
the threat, however remote it may appear (Cell 3), the aver-
age performance increases to 3.8%.
Note that when the threat is perceived as serious (Cells 2
and 4), the performance implications are negative on aver-
age, implying that negative aspects outweigh positive
aspects. However, by building financial and organizational
capacities, retailers can considerably mitigate the negative
performance consequences; the average performance in
Cell 4 is 73% higher than the one in Cell 2.
Figure 2 further reports in each cell the means for the
three alternative performance metrics considered—the
mean percentage growth in the period 1998–2002 in sales,
EBIT, and ROA. In general, the picture is consistent with
the results for CAR[0, 1].
Managerial Implications
We find that incumbents are significantly affected by the
entry of a giant retailer. Some performance effects will be
positive, for example, because of channelwide productivity
increases that giant retailers may bring. Other effects will
be negative, leading to a net adverse effect on the expected
performance for many retailers (Table 2). Is this unavoid-
able, or can retailers act proactively to mitigate the nega-
tives? We believe that incumbent retailers can indeed
employ proactive strategies when they are faced with the
prospect of the possible entry of a much larger competitor,
such as Wal-Mart.
To contain the seriousness of the threat, an incumbent
retailer using an EDLP strategy might consider moving to a
hi–lo strategy to render direct price comparisons with Wal-
Mart more difficult. Incumbent retailers might also reduce
the overlap in assortment with Wal-Mart by focusing on the
niches Wal-Mart does not cover. Although we acknowledge
that our operationalization of overlap in assortment is at 
a higher level of abstraction (because of a lack of more
detailed data), we believe that our results are sufficiently
intriguing to begin to shed light on this issue. Given Wal-
Mart’s focus on low prices, it is a less attractive place to
purchase specialty products (which also fall within the
broad categories previously mentioned). Target is arguably
the best example of a retailer that has consciously strived to
minimize assortment overlap with Wal-Mart. Although 70%
of Target stores are in markets in which a Wal-Mart is pres-
ent, only 30%–40% of the merchandise assortments overlap
(Slywotzky 2007), and the financial markets reward its
strategy. Target’s stock return has significantly outper-
formed Wal-Mart’s over the last years.
Retailers can reduce the overlap in assortment by carry-
ing exclusive, specialized, niche, or service-augmented
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products that are difficult to reconcile with the big-box
retailing formula that drives Wal-Mart’s success. A possi-
bility is upscale manufacturer brands that do not want to be
sold at Wal-Mart for fear of damaging their brand image.
Another option is the retailer’s own line of premium store
brands or exclusive items. For example, consider the Isaac
Mizrahi items sold exclusively at Target or the Vera Wang
line at Kohl’s. Grocery retailer Kroger is resurging on sales
of prepared and semicooked foods. Best Buy has success-
fully withstood Wal-Mart’s push into consumer electronics
by adding (high-margin) installation and other services
alongside personal computers and flat-screen televisions
(McWilliams 2007).
However, it would be unwise to underestimate Wal-
Mart’s ability to respond to these strategic moves by its
competitors. For example, it recently began selling installa-
tion services at some of its stores (McWilliams 2007). It is
also expanding its assortment, and the sophistication of its
own store-brand portfolio is continuously improving
(Kumar and Steenkamp 2007). Moreover, overlap in the
country of entry is difficult to avoid. Therefore, firms
should also consider proactively improving their capacity to
withstand the threat. Size and profitability can be increased
through mergers and acquisitions, while taking care to keep
financial leverage manageable. This is the route the French
retailer Carrefour took. In response to Wal-Mart’s move, it
acquired Promodès, becoming Europe’s largest retailer.
Less glamorous, but equally important, is honing organi-
zational learning skills. Rather than avoiding difficult
markets—competitive countries with a strong price focus—
an incumbent can acquire these skills by operating in coun-
tries that prove to be highly valuable when confronted with
Wal-Mart. The importance of these skills is illustrated by
Wal-Mart’s disappointing experience in Germany. Although
many things went wrong, including the insensitivity of Wal-
Mart to the German culture, a key reason it failed was
because it was competing with the efficient hard discounter
Aldi. Aldi has built such an efficient marketing system that
its costs of goods sold are half those of Wal-Mart (Kumar
and Steenkamp 2007). Wal-Mart found its match in a
retailer that had perfected its skills in one of the world’s
most price-focused countries.
International expansion also helps. From a financial point
of view, it stabilizes cash flows in that the retailer is less
dependent on one market. From an organizational-learning
point of view, international diversity is a major factor in the
acquisition of core competencies and strategic flexibility
(Barkema and Vermeulen 1998). Withdrawing to the home
country bastion is not a realistic option in today’s globaliz-
ing world. In this respect, Wal-Mart and other retailers are
actively expanding internationally (Gielens and Dekimpe
2007). Finally, it helps if the retailer develops Wal-Mart-
specific competitive repertoires by competing with Wal-
Mart in other countries. The important role of organiza-
tional learning in company performance reveals that both
large and small retailers have a chance to prosper after a
massive competitor enters the market: the former by virtue
of their financial resources and the right organizational
competencies and the latter by having acquired the right
organizational competencies.
Thus, when an incumbent retailer is faced with the possi-
bility of entry by a much larger competitor, there are sev-
eral actions it can take to prepare proactively for this even-
tuality. We find that financial markets can and will place a
monetary value on these strategic actions, providing an
important link between marketing strategies and financial
outcomes.
Limitations and Further Research
Our study has several limitations that offer avenues for
further research. First, we study the effect of one foreign
acquisition by a giant retailer on the performance of incum-
bent retailers using the metric of shareholder value, though
we validate our framework with alternative performance
measures. Further research could study other foreign acqui-
sitions by giant retailers. It is also necessary to investigate
the extent to which our results hold when market entry
takes place by starting a greenfield operation. It would be
worthwhile to examine the extent to which the relative
importance of the various moderators is itself moderated by
mode of entry (i.e., acquisition versus greenfield).
Second, our framework could be tested in other indus-
tries. This would make it possible to assess whether the
negative net effect we observe across all parties studied
(i.e., the different European retailers in our sample, Asda,
and Wal-Mart) is observed when a giant enters a foreign
market or whether this is a Wal-Mart-specific or retail-
industry-specific finding. Further research could also exam-
ine the role of the size of the acquiring firm on the stock
market reaction for incumbent players.
Finally, it would be worthwhile considering to which
market parties the net performance effect of –$5.68 billion
was dissipated. Did key suppliers of the European retailers
benefit or Wal-Mart’s U.S. retail competitors in the antici-
pation that Wal-Mart would lose its focus? Did the market
view the entry of Wal-Mart as a loss for retailers but a gain
for consumers in terms of more intense competition and
lower prices (for a quantification of the consumer surplus
following Wal-Mart’s entry into local U.S. markets, see
Hausman and Leibtag 2005)?
We show that to understand the performance implications
of major strategic marketing actions, it is necessary to
include marketing (e.g., assortment, positioning), finance
(e.g., financial leverage), and strategic management (e.g.,
international diversity, symmetry in geographical overlap)
constructs. None of these three theoretical lenses gives the
full picture; combined, however, they describe the perform-
ance implications of a major entry into the marketplace.
Marketing, an inherently interdisciplinary science, is ide-
ally suited to achieve this.




Operationalized as the sum of the shares of retailer i’s sales,
realized in the P product markets in which it meets Wal-Mart,
where Si,p represents the share of retailer i’s sales made in








In 1998, the Belgian retailer Delhaize operated in the grocery
and drugstore market and generated, respectively, 78% and 22%
of its sales in these two markets. Because Wal-Mart was active
in both product markets, Delhaize’s overlap index equals 100%.
Overlap in
positioning
Operationalized as a dummy variable that equals 1 if retailer i
has experience as an EDLP player and 0 if otherwise.
In 1998, Delhaize acquired EDLP experience through its U.S.




Expressed as the share of sales Si generated by retailer i in the
United Kingdom in 1998.
In 1998, Delhaize was not active in the United Kingdom.
Therefore, its overlap in the United Kingdom equals 0.
Firm size Total global sales of retailer i. In 1998, Delhaize’s total sales were $12 billion.
Firm profitability Retailer i’s funds available from operations divided by sales
(Fee and Thomas 2004).
In 1998, Delhaize’s profitability amounted to 4.9%.
Financial leverage The ratio of debt to total assets (Moeller, Schlingemann, and
Stulz 2004). 





where Dc equals the share of discount activity in country c’s
retail sector, Si,c refers to the share of sales realized by retailer i
in country c, and C equals the total number of countries in








In 1998, Delhaize was present in ten countries: Belgium, the
Czech Republic, France, Greece, Indonesia, Luxembourg,
Singapore, Slovakia, Thailand, and the United States. In these
countries Delhaize obtained, respectively, 21%, 2%, 2%, 3%,
.1%, .2%, .6%, .1%, .1%, and 71% of its sales. In these
countries, the share of discount activities amounted to,
respectively, 10.8%, 9.7%, 6.1%, 2.4%, .07%, 2.9%, 0%, 1.8%,
0%, and 1.16%. Thus, the weighted share of discount operations






where COMPc refers to country c’s IMD World Comptitiveness
Score (an index between 0 and 100) in country c and Si,c refers
to retailer i’s share of sales in country c, where C is the total








In 1998, the IMD national competitiveness ranks for the ten
countries in which Delhaize operated ranged from 34.4
(Indonesia) to 100 (the United States). When the previously
mentioned shares of operations in these countries are used as




Expressed as a Herfindahl-type index, 
based on Si,c, the proportion of retailer i’s sales in country c,
where C refers to the total number of countries in which the









Given the shares of sales in the ten countries in which Delhaize




The number of countries in which both the retail firm and Wal-
Mart are present.
In 1998, Wal-Mart operated in seven geographic markets: its
U.S. home market (in which it realized 83.9% of its total sales),
Mexico (9%), Germany (4.8%), Argentina (.8%), Brazil (.5%),
South Korea (.3%), and China (.2%). In turn, Delhaize was
present in ten countries. However, because Wal-Mart and
Delhaize met in only one market, the United States, Delhaize’s
geographic market overlap with Wal-Mart equals 1.
Appendix
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Operationalized as the sum of the shares of retailer i’s sales, 
realized in geographic markets in which it meets Wal-Mart,
where Si represents the share of retailer i’s total sales realized in
mutual host country mc and MC expresses the total number of








In Delhaize’s case, the geographic importance index equals






where Si,mc (SWM,mc) represents the share of retailer i’s (Wal-
Mart’s) total sales realized in mutual host country mc and MC
expresses the number of markets in which they have contact (see
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Delhaize realized 71.3% of its sales in the United States, the
market it shared with Wal-Mart. Because Wal-Mart realized 83.9%
of its 1998 sales in the U.S. market, Delhaize’s geographic
symmetry index equals 87.4 (= 100 – |71.3 – 83.9|).
Appendix
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Notes: To avoid potential endogeneity issues, we calculated all measures using 1998 (the year before Wal-Mart’s acquisition of Asda) data.
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